The present article introduces the concept of anthropological practice as a special practice of transformation and change of a person. The concept is discussed in terms of
M. Foucault mostly cared for (which reminds us
of care again) the fact that was the most important from his point of view: we, modern European intellectuals, have forgotten ourselves (Foucault, 2007) . We need to reinterpret it all for ourselves and begin from scratch again. Foucault assumed that we have forgotten our actual human duty, which is to take care of ourselves.
Foucault associated care of the self with one's current situation and what is happening around a person. And as he believed, the things happening around were not good. Because, first of all, the human has forgotten himself. Secondly, he does not understand himself at all any more.
For this reason, we need to re-start ourselves.
And here is the point where Foucault turned to history.
But phenomenon did not turn into a concept but remained a phenomenon. Let's try to rely on the phenomenon itself and ask ourselves some framework questions, introduce some criteria and milestones for further analysis made in the form of framework topes, i.e. entities we fill with this or that content.
Tope on: ontological source of care.
How ontologically enrooted is the self-care phenomenon? Does it act as an ontological milestone and support? What do modern researchers say and write about it? Do they go farther than their predecessors, are there too many problems and unexplored facts?
Tope two: discourse of care. What do we say, and how do we do it, speaking of self-care?
What words do we use? What vocabulary do we develop to speak of our care phenomenon? Don't we lose the basic meanings in our rich and circumlocutory self-care talks? Have we preserved the cultural etymons of ontological meanings? Or is it not only the ontological source that is lost, but also our discourse and our vocabulary, exhausted and reduced? What is the meaning of this action? May selfcare be described as a work, as a special practice, or, to be precise, an anthropological practice?
Is this practice limited to a moral care of your fellow creature or is it a special ascetic practice assuming transformation of the one engaged in care of the self? What is the difference of selfcare from other practices? If it is different, it needs specific goals and tasks, types of activities and results. Or do we overload this phenomenon, trying to squeeze all richness of the practices into the underlying, but only one moral principle of one's responsibility of the fellow creature and, therefore, the responsibility of himself?
Now, let us elaborate on each of the topes.
The result will be formulated as a conclusion of the four topes, revealing the sense of the phenomenon to its full.
Tope one: Ontological source of care
If we want to understand this or that phenomenon, we need to understand its ontological source, which makes it what it is and extrudes it into its own being.
To enroot the phenomenon of care of the self, many authors turn to the heritage of M. Heidegger (Poliakova, 2015; Solov'iov, 2006; Fedicheva, 2010) . For instance, M.A. Poliakova quotes an old fable by the Roman scientist and writer Julius Hyginus, also cited by the German philosopher in his "Being and Time" (Poliakova, 2015) 1 .
Roman writer and scientist Julius Hyginus practically turned to the ancient mythopoetic concept of birth of the anthropogenic world from the first man, whose parts of body were connected to the parts of the world (unity of micro and macrocosm). According to the fable, Cura (Care) picked some mud and shaped it, and then asked Jupiter to give it spirit. He gladly granted. Then the gods decided to name what they had created.
They named it homo, for it is made of hummus (earth). This is how the first man was created.
This travelling story of a man created of earth, mud, "the dust of the ground", on one hand, and the divine breath on the other ("the Lord God <…> breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living being" (Genesis, 2, 7) shows, as M. Heidegger claims, the archetypical genesis and basis of pre-ontological foundation of the phenomenon of care. That is how Adam was created. Then M. Heidegger substantiates the idea of care as a component of his philosophic concept of being as presence. He sees care as an "existential and basic ontological phenomenon" (Heidegger, 1997: 196) . For the German philosopher, care acts as an ontological "being in presence", which, actually, is what a human is, i.e.
Dasein. Therefore, for M. Heidegger care is not a feature of psychological or moral obligation of a subject to himself or another person. Care is an ontological feature of the being itself, and human is its organ. In this case the main object of care is the person's aspiration to step in the "passage of being", enrooted in being itself, and to shape himself as an organ of being, through which being reveals itself to human in its unconcealed form.
Revelation of the concealed is the ontological sense of care, while the entire human becomes an organ of care, which cannot be restricted or reduced to any ontical or empirical examples.
It is worthwhile remarking that we are speaking of "care" as the root part of the ontological presence, not as "self-care". The subjective prefix appeared in culture much later.
It all began with the pre-ontological image of the mythological deity named Cura, then it entered the flesh of matter as the primary element of water or air, and remained there as the being of a human directed to itself. Then the reflective "self" prefix began to dominate in the scope studied by researchers, and various authors got involved in studying this prefix more than care itself. However, let us point at some opacity of the topic in M. Heidegger's work. The subject matter is the second most significant work by M. Heidegger after "Being and Time", which is "Contributions to philosophy (from Enowning)" (Heidegger, 2009) . This work was published not so long ago and the first comments were given by Bibikhin, V.V. (Bibikhin, 2009 (Heidegger, 2009: 67) . If there is any leap, any shift in this work by M. Heidegger, then it is directed towards the concept of Event, which practically continues the motive of purely ontological character of care as a way of being for a human, since the human's care of being is what makes its being eventful and ontologically consistent (see above in our Section 1).
As M. Heidegger suggests, a person cares of himself as of existence, when he performs the act of opening up to the unconcealed (concealed) being, roots into the unconcealed and therefore becomes a measure for the existence of being himself (Heidegger, 2007: 121) . Human is a measure of existence as much as he opens up to the existence and as much existence as the unconcealed opens up to him. This action of opening oneself up to the existence is the ontologically enrooted form of caring of oneself as of a human.
The ontological tope problems also encompass the issue connected with distinguishing between "self-cognition" (γνῶϑί σαυτόν) and "self-care" (ἐπιμέλεια (Smirnov, 2015: 642-657 attention. V.I. Dal also points out the figure of a "carer" in songs and wedding ceremonies; that is a guardian, a labourer, a protector, a breadwinner (Dal', 2007: 502) .
As for categorial studies, the situation grows even more complicated. The first difficulty is the absence of a dictionary of anthropology or philosophy of man in our Russian philosophy and science. We have a plenty of dictionaries and encyclopaedias in linguistics, pedagogy, literature, theatre, philosophy, medicine etc. But there is no analytical dictionary of anthropology.
It has not been compiled, developed or published by the scientific community (see also Smirnov, 2015) . This is why the community has not yet developed an anthropological categorial discourse as such and has not built an approved terminological basis of anthropological concepts and categories.
The second difficulty is the actual absence of care as a category in Russian philosophic dictionaries
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. However, they include the category of "education", inside which we could outline the context of self-education and, indirectly, the context of care, but not more than that.
For this reason, the discourse tope remains the most important one in the topic of care, since the opacity and simultaneous mottle of our care talks will always affect our understanding of the care phenomenon.
For instance, V.K. Pichugina defines the phenomenon of self-care as follows:
"anthropologic discourse of "self-care" is a verbal and cogitative space objectivizing the "self-care" phenomenon, pre-determining the pedagogical mindsets and mechanisms for the implementation of adult education routes reflected in the conceptual pattern, described in the corpus of ancient pedagogic texts" (Pichugina, 2013a: 8) .
And only inside this anthropologic discourse, the "self-care" is defined as a "notion, generalizing the ideas of higher education and self-education in the ancient thesaurus, characterizing the interaction between the mentor and his student in the wide space of life" (Pichugina, 2013a: 8) . programmes for teachers (Poliakova, 2015: 90) . they need to be done in a certain mode, against the horizon of the Good, the thought of which keeps the subject within the context of care (Hadot, 2005: 23-33 ).
M. Foucault introduced a framework of self-care practices on the basis of several ancient authors (primarily, Roman stoics). He pointed out the following aspects of care:
− epimeleia as a general mindset, way of behaviour, mindset in relation to one's own self, the others, the world; − epimeleia as a special focus of attention on something, a certain optic of vision, the way of seeing described as a transfer of attention from the exterior to the interior, into one's own self; − epimeleia as a certain action, a practice, used to carry out the act of care leading to some transformation of one's own self; epimeleia as a set of practices and exercises (i.e. a certain ascetic practice performed through such techniques and exercises) (Foucault, 2007: 23) .
In other words, Foucault believes, reconstructing the ancient stoics' experience, that care of one's self is a certain practice of spirituality, assuming some practice of transformation that opens the "access to the truth" for the subject.
Without the transformation, the subject cannot achieve the access to the truth: "It postulates that
for the subject to have right of access to the truth he must be changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point, other than himself … For as he is, the subject is not capable of truth… there can be no truth without a conversion or a transformation of the subject…" (Foucault, 2007: 28) .
And why would the subject need the access to the truth? "The truth enlightens the subject; the truth gives beatitude to the subject; the truth gives the subject tranquillity of the soul… there is something that fulfils the subject himself, that fulfils or transfigures his very being" (Foucault, 2007: 29) .
These quotes encompass the whole range of problems of this talk. Let us formulate them over again in the form of questions.
Do the postulates of Foucault mean that
the subject takes care of oneself for the desire to reach tranquillity of the soul, to fulfil his being, to achieve his ultimate dreams and aspirations?
Does it mean that care of the self is not an autotelic And then the external regulation looks like a rule to be followed. Here care is limited to a set of rules, or commandments. These rules cover various spheres and fields of activities.
Sphere of cognition. Act according to the "rules for mind work", follow the regulations and rational action rules and you will recognize the object, i.e. you will actually possess it.
R. Descartes formulated these rules, introducing a rational regulation for any cognition. To perform the cognition process in the right way, anyone needs to follow it 10 . Isn't it a way of care?
If you do not follow the rules, you do not get the object, and you do not get the sought knowledge.
But the thing is that to adhere to the cognition rules coming from outside (mind discipline), you need to do a certain work to adjust to the rules, to make an effort that will lead to some changes in your personal structure. Therefore, an external regulation, implied to you and accepted by you as a rule for action and behaviour, becomes a part of your internal personal structure.
At all that, it is clear that for Descartes "I as a thinking thing" is obvious and does not need to be proved. Indeed, for it is an unchangeable thing. Sphere of education. Follow an academic discipline, its logic and essence, follow the instructions of your teacher and you will become as knowledgeable as himself. But here the same law of instruction comes into force: being an external academic discipline, becoming discipline as an internal structure of regulationabiding behaviour, becomes a part of one's own personal organization. By the way, Foucault himself also remarked the principle of care of the self in pedagogy, driving it into the internal sphere, or psychogogy: a teacher shall care of the care, to make his student take care of himself (care of care) (Foucault, 2007: 75 Looking ahead, let us say that it is the reflectivity that seems to be the "subject", or that thing in the subject that actually needs care. But let's talk about it later.
So, we arrive at the notion of internal regulation, i.e. some spiritual order, the organon of the personality that is developed in the self- Apply some effort to yourself, change yourself and you will discover something that you cannot achieve through any external regulation. That is when the care of the self becomes the ascesis, the practice of abstinence and self-transformation.
In this case, we may speak of care of the self as a basic anthropological practice, for it implies development of what makes a man a man, i.e. a creature capable of metamorphosis, of a second birth. It is care of the self that launches the mechanism of opening oneself up to the other and transformation of the self.
But to do it, we need to introduce some framework, some benchmarks that would outline the limits and borderlines of self-care as a concept and a practice. You can do it this way or that way. You are almost the one you imitate. But it is always "almost".
"As though" you are someone else, but it is not you. It is the person you imitate. You pretend, it is not real, it is a make-believe. You are not an animal, or a train, or a car, or some wind, even if you act like a car or like wind. Through these constant practices of imitation you surely change, but it is mimicry, like an animal changing its colours. Such individual capacity of mimicking and pretending is the specialness, individuality of the subject of pretending. But this sort of care has its limits and boundaries. This care is similar to the agon-care. But an agonist outfits to win, while the pretender masters various techniques to imitate the object of mimesis more and more accurately. He is striving to blend with the object of mimesis, to dissolve in it, so that an observer does not notice any difference.
Benchmark four: care as cogito. Care as thinking understood in the categories of cogito.
As an act of thought driving the author of thought to the limit of cognition. Care as a reflective act outlining the borderline of the act of thought itself.
Benchmark five: care of the self as transformation, metamorphosis of the personality.
Only after the first abovementioned practices, the subject develops the experience of care and is considered to be ready for internal transformation. It cannot be forced on him as a repression. He may take up this practice only through the maturity of soul and acceptance of the need for care, as care of overcoming his own self, mundane and inferior.
Gradually the practice of changes reaches its limit, after which the subject of changes has done so much and has changed his initial individual nature so much that it just disappeared. while the later Christian model of self-rejection was a step backwards (Foucault, 2007: 281-285) . For Foucault, the experience of monastery asceticism meant separation from the practices of the self. As Khoruzhiy suggests, the ancient practices of the self lacked the basic element, which is the ontological measure, opening up to the ontologically Other; there was no practice of unlocking that was later developed in the Christian monastery ascesis (Khoruzhiy, 1998) .
In any case, if we happen to step aside from the topic of reconstruction of the ancient and Christian practices, care of the self really begins with the radical problematization of the self, from the "self- it is principally accidental and impossible to enroot" (Bakhtin, 2003: 51) . The sense of the ontological crack was found in the "abyss that appeared between the motive of a deed and its product. As a consequence, the product separated from its ontological roots died away" (Bakhtin, 2003: 50) . This is the reason why a person has no alibi in being; he experiences some ontological "architectonic obligation" to actualize his only place in the only event-being, as an axiological opposition of I and the other", and the meaning of such opposition is "the absolute self-exclusion" (Bakhtin, 2003: 68) .
Thus, care of the self is an ontological duty of the person, and for this reason it may not be limited to any theoretical act of cognition, or to adhering to some external moral instruction, or to the wilful effort of an athlete, or to the psychotechnical exercise-action, or the theatrical mimesis of the actor.
Tope four: the subject of care
So, we discovered that the object of care may be different. But then, who is the one who carries out the care? What is his subjectivity, individuality, personality? Who is the bearer of the care practice?
As it has been remarked above, based on the ancient practices of the self, Foucault formulated this subjectivity as reflectivity, reflective recurrence (Foucault, 2007: 53-54) . Practice of the self implies application to the object of care.
And if the New European understanding of the cognition subject may not be applied to the ancient practices of the self, some practice of reflectivity to oneself as a practice of care in the style of Roman stoics seems quite applicable. Therefore, the subject matter is not the subject as a ready independent source of thought as in cogito principle of Descartes, it is the personal reflection that is absent in the natural you; you have to develop and cultivate it. Then, starting from Socrates, the subjectivity of care is understood as a special activeness of care of god in one's self, in the soul, in the moral organization of the human internal structure. Strictly, the cultural etymon itself implies that practice is not limited to action. Practice is a deed you do with knowledge, special attention, responsibility, and love. Being practical (πρακτικός) does not mean to be acting; it means being responsible, in charge of some action, which actually means care.
Then, as it has already been said above, practice of the self as a sort of care means practice of one's transformation of his own self, of his individual, old structure, the structure of an "old", mortal person, and building a personal structure, a cultural organon on top of it.
In different researchers such practice is referred to in different ways: spiritual exercise, spiritual practice, cultural practice, anthropological practice.
Often such notions seem to be synonymic. To finish our talk, let us present the table (Table 1 ) demonstrating the differences between the anthropological practices of the care of the self in their objects, essences, subjects, and super objectives with regard to the above classification experience and building the care topic.
Obviously, the titles refer to the identity of subject, not to his profession. It should be also noted that the differences are conventional and do not imply any objective or material establishment of this or that practice. The practices differ not only physically and objectively, but in their essence and purpose. In this regard, an actor's work of the self may be agon, or mimesis, or even end up with transformation, just like a philosophic speech may be dedicated to agon, may be a theatrical action, or may become an act of transformation. The discovery of this mythological story is significant by itself. M. Heidegger came across the story in one of the articles by a poorly known author C. Burdach "Faust and care". The latter pointed out that he adopted the story from Goethe, who had used it for his Faust. But he also borrowed the story from Herder. The latter found the fable in a book by a Roman writer (Heidegger, 1997: 197, remark 1) . Literature knows plenty of travelling adventure stories. This is why they keep travelling: they touch on the archetypical and existential features of human existence.
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If what we mean is the aesthetic change made by Sophocles. The whole tragedy of Sophocles is based on the game of blindness and sight. That is what S.S. Averintsev wrote about (Averintsev, 972) . Previously, the final of ancient mythological stories looked less theatrically and aesthetically: having discovered the secret, the hero of the ancient myth castrated himself. The blindness of Oedipus may be considered to be a later aesthetic change. (Graves, 1992: 284) . However, that was the shortened version of the return, in the form of "self-practices", but without being, for which P. Hadot had been criticizing M. Foucault, reproaching him of "dandyism" (Hadot, 2005: 210) . The return finally happened in the version of "Foucault without Heidegger".
4
The Russian word care (zabota) may be related to the root zob, zobati "to eat (grain)", "to dab", "to devour", because caring about something eats a person, devours him from inside (Vasmer, 2004: 70-71) .
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Let us remark that in the European tradition the situation is a little better, for the Latin cura had naturally entered the concept list of the European scientific discourse and is now present in the modern thesauruses (see Pichugina, 2014 Pichugina, , 2013a Pichugina, , 2014b Poliakova, 2015) .
of translations of the Italian authors mentioned and not mentioned above, published in Russian scientific publications (Graves, 1992; Kambi, 2015; Camilleri, 2015; Mortari, 2015) .
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One of the archetypical cultural images of care is a sower, pushing the plough across the field, copying the divine cultivation and bringing up the seed of peace, likening his education and care of the world to the cultivation of the image of God sowed inside himself. This image was also reflected in the well-known mystic saying formulated as the palindrome: "Sator Arepo tenet opera rotas" ("The farmer Arepo has [as] works wheels [a plough]"). The five words are written in a square symbolizing a demarcated field, across which a sower with a plough is walking, repeating the Primary Action of the God the Demiurge, the Creator (Sator). All words inside the square read the same in both directions.
8
A.V. Akhutin and other researchers suggest that it is not hermeneutics and not the subject that is the subject matter of Foucault's lectures (Akhutin, 2009) . It looks right. Foucault himself spoke of the death of the subject, of the ultimate experience of "desubjectivization" of the subject, of the experience letting the subject tear himself out from his own self. But it does not make it easier. Then what or who is the subject matter? Yes, it is not hermeneutics; it is the care of one's self. Yes, it is not the subject, but what is it about then?
